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INTRODUCTION 
The Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA) was launched to 
the International Space Station (ISS) in August 2001 and 
was the first instrument to provide near real-time 
measurement of volatile organic compounds in a 
spacecraft atmosphere.  The VOA performed an 
analysis of the ISS air approximately twice a month for 
most of its operation through May 2003.  This 
intermittent operation, caused by a software interface 
issue with the ISS communication bus, slowed the 
validation of the VOA.  However, operational validation 
was completed in 2003 when analysis of air samples 
collected in grab sample containers (GSCs) compared 
favorably with simultaneous VOA runs (1).  
The VOA has two channels that provide redundant 
function, albeit at slightly reduced performance, when 
only one channel is operating (2).  Most target 
compounds can be detected on both channels.  In 
January 2003, the VOA identified a malfunction in the 
channel 2 preconcentrator and it shut down that 
channel.  The anomaly profile suggested that a fuse 
might have failed, but the root cause could not be 
determined.  In May 2003, channel 1 was shut down 
when the detector’s elevated temperature could not 
longer be maintained.  Since both VOA channels were 
now deactivated, VOA operations ended until an in-flight 
repair could be planned and executed.   
This paper describes the process to repair the VOA and 
to revalidate it for operations, and then an account is 
given of the VOA’s contribution following a contingency 
event on ISS.      
EXPERIMENTAL 
ON-ORBIT DIAGNOSTICS 
The error messages displayed for the failures of the 
channel 2 preconcentrator and the channel 1 ion mobility 
Spectrometer (IMS) detector indicated the same 
problem: an inability to maintain the component 
temperature.  This fault could have been caused by any 
of three elements: heater, heater drive board, or thermal 
fuse.  The temperature sensors properly followed the 
declining temperature of the two affected units; therefore 
they were not considered to be the problem.  The VOA 
is a complex instrument; therefore detailed procedures 
to isolate and test each suspect element were 
developed on an identical VOA ground unit.  
The crew took the VOA out of the Crew Health Care 
System rack and removed covers to access the 
components to be tested.  Crew inspections of the 
preconcentrator and IMS heater boards showed them to 
be free of damage.  Next, the crew checked the 
preconcentrator and IMS fuse-heater circuits to 
determine if they or the boards had failed.  These tests 
revealed that the channel 2 preconcentrator and channel 
1 IMS circuits were open.  The question remained 
whether the heaters or the fuses had failed on each 
channel.  The thermal fuses for both components 
(Figure 1) were located and tested.  The tests showed 
blown fuses on both components and a check of the 
heater circuit confirmed the heaters were operating 
properly. 
Figure 1 Fuse position and testing A) IMS cell  B) preconcentrator  
INFLIGHT MAINTENANCE 
The diagnosis of failed fuses meant that the VOA could 
be repaired on orbit.  These parts were not intended to 
be replaceable; therefore, nine months were required to 
create the procedure and arrange the crew time (almost 
24 h) to perform the in-flight maintenance (IFM).   
As before, a significant period of time was required for 
the crew to gain access to the components.  The 
preconcentrator fuses were easily accessible and so 
they were the first to be replaced.  The old fuses were 
removed by cutting the wire on each side, but leaving 
sufficient wire to connect the new fuse with a crimp 
connector.  Replacing fuses on the IMS cells could 
easily introduce noise to the detector signal, unless the 
crew adhered exactly to the directions for removal of the 
old fuse and placement of the new fuse and associated 
wiring. 
Some VOA parts (i.e. scrubbers and pumps) were orbital 
replacement units (ORUs), which are parts designed to 
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be replaced at regular intervals.  It was important that 
these be replaced after the IFM, because their 
operational life had expired.  
  DISCUSSION 
VOA RESTART AND FUNCTION CHECK 
VOA repairs were completed and the unit was restarted 
in December 2005.  A functional check of the VOA was 
necessary because digging deep into a complex, 
sensitive instrument during a repair always poses a risk 
of damaging other components.  Furthermore, the VOA 
had been idle for 2.5 years, during which time offgas 
products and contaminants from the cabin had 
accumulated in the VOA’s preconcentrators, gas 
chromatograph (GC) columns, and IMS detectors.   
The channel 2 positive and negative mode reactant ion 
peaks (RIP) for the early calibration runs (no sample 
acquired) are plotted in the Figure 2.  In both modes the 
RIP was barely visible in the first few calibrant runs, but 
by the 6th run the RIPs were apparent.  The VOA was in 
standby for nearly month and in this state the VOA can 
self-clean, since carrier gas flows through the GC, the 
detector is maintained at elevated temperatures, and a 
recirculated gas flow scrubs the detector.  The 
cumulative effect of almost a month in standby 
translated into the substantial RIP peak heights seen in 
both modes for the 7th calibrant run in January 2006.  
The RIPs from this calibrant run compared to those of 
the December 2002 run (known good RIPs) showed 
similar peak height and position, thus affirming the VOA 
operational readiness.   
Figure 2 Channel 2 runs for December 2005 and the first run in 
January 2006 A) Positive RIP and B) Negative RIP 
Although the channel 1 RIP plots (Figure 3) appeared 
similar to that of the channel 2 RIP, in this case the RIP 
in both modes was significantly displaced to the right of 
Figure 3 Channel 1 runs for December 2005 and the first run in 
January 2006 A) Positive RIP and B) Negative RIP 
the December 2002 peak.  Accurate ion mobility is 
crucial to proper compound identification.  The ion’s 
mobility is normalized for pressure, temperature, and 
electric field strength.  It was determined that the 
channel 1 pressure sensor, used for normalizing the ion 
mobility, had drifted slightly from its calibration.  All ions, 
not just the RIP, exhibited this offset.  Fortunately, the 
pressure sensor remained stable and the problem was 
easily corrected by modifying the identification database 
to reflect the pressure sensor offset. 
 
VOA REVALIDATION 
The VOA was clean and functioning, so the next task 
was to determine if it could accurately identify and 
quantify the target compounds typically in the ISS 
atmosphere.  
The VOA was calibrated for the required target 
compounds (3) and its performance and calibration were 
verified by challenge mixture runs prior to its launch in 
2001.  The VOA was operationally validated in flight 
during 200-2003.  The revalidation of the VOA in 2006 
mirrored the previous validation method (4).  In this 
method the VOA analyses were compared with the 
ground-based analyses of several simultaneously 
acquired grab sample containers (GSC) samples.  For 
compounds detected above trace levels, the VOA had to 
identify and quantify these compounds within +/-50% of 
the GSC analysis. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the 2006 concentration data for 
the four compounds consistently detected above trace 
levels in the VOA and GSC samples.  All 2006 VOA runs 
are shown, in addition to the VOA/GSC coordinated 
runs, to construct the temporal variation in the 
compound concentration.  Channel 1 data were plotted 
only to June 2006 because at that time this detector was 
shut down, most likely because of a failed fuse.     BA
VOA data for ethanol and 2-propanol (IPA) are 
presented in Figure 4.  Only VOA/GSC matched data 
are shown for ethanol on Channel 1 because the data 
was extrapolated using a limited data set, thus limiting 
accuracy.  The channel 1 GC column does not separate 
2-propanol from other compounds; therefore detection 
and quantification used only channel 2 data. 
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Figure 4 Plots of 2006 VOA data for ethanol and 2-propanol, plus 
matched GSC samples 
It can be seen that compound concentrations for most of 
the VOA/GSC-matched samples were within the stated 
+/-50%.  The reproducibility of the VOA is illustrated by 
the tight values for consecutive runs in April. 
The graphs of acetone and n-butanol (Figure 5) 
demonstrated a less variable pattern than seen for the 
alcohols in Figure 4.  This might be explained by the fact 
that the main sources for these compounds are 
offgassing and human metabolism, whereas ethanol and 
2-propanol are related to episodic onboard activities 
such as medical experiments.  Again, most results met 
the acceptance criteria, but the success rate was poorer 
for acetone. 
Figure 5 Plots of 2006 VOA data for acetone and n-butanol 
Data produced by the VOA runs and the GSC samples 
are compared in Table 1 for compounds detected above 
trace levels.  Acetaldehyde is adequately separated only 
on the channel 1 GC; therefore, acetaldehyde 
quantitation was lost when the VOA’s channel 1 was 
disabled in June 2006.  Results were excellent for 
acetaldehyde, 2-propanol, and n-butanol, with the last 
two having only one outlier in the 7 samples.  Acetone 
had three points outside the ± 50% criterion, but one 
point was only slightly (52%) above the requirement.  
Ethanol concentrations were consistently beyond the 
VOA calibration curve, which necessitated extrapolation 
and this led to larger errors.  
When compared with analysis of GSC samples, the 
VOA correctly identified compounds at trace 
concentrations and just as importantly, it did not detect 
compounds that were not present in the ISS 
atmosphere.  Discrepancies in trace levels of a few 
Table 1 Comparison of VOA and GSC analytical results reported as % 
error.  Shaded cells value did not meet the ± 50% requirement. *The 
9/18 data point (52%) is included in the last column total. 
compounds occurred because the detection limit for the 
analytical methods of the VOA IMS) and the GSC (gas 
chromatography/mass spectrometry) are different for 
some compounds. 
In spite of these data, the VOA’s age and the 6-year 
interval since its last calibration have led to a cautious 
approach called “quantitative trending.”  This allows the 
data to have a larger error band (>± 50%), but the data 
are still of sufficient quality for operational decision-
making in ISS contingency scenarios. 
RESULTS 
The VOA plays an important role during contingency 
events on ISS, even with the restriction of “quantitative 
trending”.  The timeline in Figure 6 details the actions 
taken during the September 2006 Elektron incident.  
This event will be used to illustrate how the VOA data is 
interpreted and used for decision-making in these 
scenarios.  
The Russian Elektron produces oxygen for ISS via water 
electrolysis and the oxygen then enters the ISS after 
passing through several filters.  In September 2006, the 
crew had been working for several hours to restart the 
Elektron, but once it began operating the crew noticed a 
white smoke being released from the unit.  Initially 
thinking it was a fire, the crew enacted the ISS fire 
protocol, which led to the quick deactivation of the 
intermodular ventilation (IMV).   
Elektron Incident
September 18, 2006 
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Figure 6 Elektron incident timeline of events related to air quality. P1 
and P2 refer to Part 1 and Part 2 of the VOA runs. 
Fortunately, a routine VOA sample session occurred 
during the time of the incident.  The protocol required a 
dilute sample run (10 ml sample), which was 
coordinated with a GSC sample, followed by a full 
sample run (40 ml) about 3 hours later.  It is important to 
note that the VOA is located in the U.S. LAB and the 
Elektron is in the Russian Service Module (SM).  
Normally, there is good mixing of the air between the 
two modules, but it can be seen in Figure 6 that the IMV 
was deactivated during the peak of the incident.  The 
first GSC was acquired in the LAB next to the VOA, but 
this was prior to the event’s major release.  The other 
GSC, acquired in the SM, wasn’t coordinated with the 
VOA run in proximity or time.   
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(Total 7)
Ethanol -42 -44 -13 104 -83 38 40 5
Acetone -26 -66 -41 -44 -52 -62 -22 5*
2-Propanol 18 13 -40 -71 10 -20 -15 6
n-Butanol 1 -10 69 2 29 -8 -17 6
Acetaldehyde -28 -32 2 of 2 The positive-mode compounds will be the focus of the 
discussion, because they were the contaminants of most 
interest for this event.  Positive-mode compounds are 
detected only in the sample acquisition for the VOA’s 
Part 2 of the run (“P2” in Fig 6), since channel 1 has 
been disabled. 
In Figure 7, the xylene mobility (1/ko=0.499) is plotted as 
a function of GC retention time (GCRT) for VOA runs 
during the Elektron incident and nominal ISS runs (Sept 
4 and Nov 14).  The most striking observation was that a 
peak not found in nominal ISS runs had appeared at a 
GCRT of 2180 seconds.  The unknown peak is very 
large in the dilute run, especially given that its sample 
volume was one-fourth of a full run.  Important clues to 
this compound’s identity were that its mobility was the 
same as the xylenes and the GCRT was slightly shorter 
than m/p-xylene.  Additionally, toluene (GCRT=1884 
sec, 1/ko= 0.463), another aromatic, was also detected 
at significantly elevated levels in the full sample run.  
The unknown was most likely ethylbenzene based upon 
the Figure 7 Xylene mobility (1/ko= 0.499) plotted as a function of GC 
retention time. A) Dilute run,  B) full run 
aforementioned information.  Strengthening 
ethylbenzene’s case was its identical molecular weight 
to xylene and a boiling point (bp) that was slightly lower 
than m/p-xylene.  That ethylbenzene and toluene had 
identical molecular weights and similar molecular 
structure would account for the like 1/kos.  
Ethylbenzene’s lower bp explains its elution from the GC 
column (apolar) slightly before m/p-xylene.   By contrast, 
toluene elutes from the GC column much earlier and has 
a faster drift time than the xylenes, which is sensible 
given toluene’s smaller molecular weight and lower bp.  
Although confident the peak’s identity was ethylbenzene, 
it wasn’t until the return of the GSC samples that this 
was verified.       
Another important compound detected by the VOA was 
benzene, albeit just above the VOA’s detection limit.  
The mobility spectra for this compound are shown in 
Figure 8.  The calibration standards plotted in the graph 
illustrate the VOA’s weak response for this compound.   
Figure 8 Benzene mobility for standard mixtures and Elektron sample:  
A) 1/ko =0.424 and B) 1/ko = 0.481 
However, the sensitivity is actually better than expected 
because the drift gas is kept fairly dry.  Although the 
September run is noisy, it is clear that benzene is 
present.  The graph in Figure 8B is of a second peak 
always detected when benzene is present, but it has 
never been determined if this is a compound created by 
a reaction of benzene in the heated preconcentrator or a 
benzene adduct. 
A comparison of results from the VOA and the GSC 
samples is depicted in Figure 9 along with the event 
timeline and sample location.  The GSC sample (10:45) 
acquired in the LAB prior to the Elektron event shows 
only trace concentrations (detected, but below method 
quantitation limit) of the aromatic compounds detected at 
high concentrations in later samples.  The trace levels 
for these compounds matches the profile of a nominal  
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 Figure 9 Results from VOA and GSC samples during the Elektron 
incident.  Columns with dotted pattern represent trace concentration. 
ISS sample run completed on September 4.  The 1st 
GSC was coordinated with Part 1 of the VOA run.  
Unfortunately, the event began after the acquisition of 
the Part 1sample, but in any case the compounds 
released (aromatics) during the event were those 
detected in Part 2. The VOA Part 2 sample was acquired 
approximately 90 minutes after the Part 1 sample and 1 
hour after the reported Elektron incident.  The Part 2 
data clearly illustrated a significant increase in the 
aromatic compounds.  The VOA was never calibrated for 
ethylbenzene or dilute runs, so this data had to be 
extrapolated.  Nevertheless, the detector response 
showed an unmistakable concentration increase for 
these aromatics.  Noting that the IMV was active for only 
5 minutes after the incident, it was concluded that the 
levels of aromatics in the VOA dilute sample came from 
a much earlier “unseen” release of these compounds.  In 
fact these compounds were likely released in the initial 
attempts to restart the Elektron at lower amperage. 
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The IMV was restarted about 12:46 and at 13:03 the 
crew reported fewer odors in the SM.  Although the 2nd 
GSC acquired a SM sample 30 minutes after the crew 
reported less odor, the concentrations of the aromatics 
were still quite high.  The 2nd VOA run, an hour after the 
GSC sample, demonstrated that the air quality was 
being restored, but there were still higher than normal 
concentrations of the aromatics in the atmosphere.   
The combination of GSC and VOA samples created a 
consistent picture of the air quality over the entire 
timeline.  Prior to the event the initial GSC sample 
showed a nominal atmosphere; however the VOA data 
revealed that air quality degradation had begun, 
unbeknownst to the crew.  Although peak concentrations 
in the SM were unknown, the later GSC sample and 
VOA run depicted a quickly improving atmosphere once 
the IMV was re-activated.  The VOA sample on 9/25 
showed the ISS air quality had returned to normal.  Also, 
it is interesting to note that the xylene increases in both 
the GSC and VOA data are smaller compared to the 
other target aromatics.  Given the temporal and spatial 
difference in VOA and GSC samples, the uniformity of 
the results is quite remarkable.   
The GSC data wasn’t available until months after the 
event, but the VOA data was used immediately to help 
assess any potential impact on the crew.  Additionally, 
the VOA showed that the atmosphere was back to 
nominal by the next scheduled VOA run. 
The data provided two other important pieces of 
information.  First, data pointed to the fact that the 
incident began as much 60-90 minutes before the crew 
observed the problem.  Secondly, the cause of the event 
could have been a release of organics from one of the 
filters.  An offgas report showed that a Russian sealant 
released the compounds observed in this event and in 
approximately the same concentration ratio; therefore it 
was speculated that the overheating of a sealant in the 
Elektron produced the compounds released. 
CONCLUSION 
The data in this paper has shown the process required 
to diagnosis, repair, and re-activate the VOA after being 
idle for 2.5 years.  The value of the VOA was 
demonstrated by the wealth of real-time information it 
provided during and after the Elektron event on ISS.  
The VOA data enabled insight into the source of the 
problem, the propagation of the problem, and the data 
helped in assessment of the incident and the impact to 
the crew.  The GSC samples, analyzed much later on 
the ground, corroborated the conclusions from the VOA 
data. 
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